

## Community resources

[Follow us on Twitter](#) [Check our Reddit](#) [Twitter this](#) [Digg this page](#) [Contact us on IRC](#)

*courage is contagious*

### Viewing cable 06MOSCOW3335,

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the [structure of a cable](#) as well as how to [discuss them](#) with others. See also the [FAQs](#)

#### Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

#### Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags [#cablegate](#) and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. [#06MOSCOW3335](#).

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
<a href="#">06MOSCOW3335</a>	2006-03-31 09:06	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Moscow

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.novgaz.ru/data/2011/001/16.html>

VZCZCXRO8344  
RR RUEHDBU  
DE RUEHMO #3335/01 0900906  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
R 310906Z MAR 06  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3312  
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE  
RUEHHD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE  
  
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 003335

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2016 TAGS: [PGOV](#) [ECON](#) [PINR](#) [RS](#)

REF: A. 05 MOSCOW 14734 B. MOSCOW 1082 C. MOSCOW 1434 D. 05 MOSCOW 15735 E. MOSCOW 3218 Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.

¶1. (C) SUMMARY. In the months since President Putin's November 14 personnel reshuffle that moved Dmitriy Medvedev and Sergey Ivanov into succession, (C) On November 14 Putin shook up the political scene with a major personnel reshuffle in the Presidential Administration (PA) and government. PUTIN, MEDVEDEV AND SERGEY IVANOV -----

¶3. (C) Most observers continue to see the November reshuffle as confirming Putin's commitment to step down at the end of his current term. In

¶4. (C) Dmitriy Medvedev was initially seen as the big winner in the November reshuffle. By moving him from PA chief to First Deputy Prime Minister

¶5. (C) Heading the national projects initiative offers MOSCOW 00003335 002 OF 004 Medvedev an opportunity to gain popularity, but it comes with

¶6. (C) Meanwhile, Medvedev must deal with political infighting with potential rivals. Venediktov told us how ill feelings arose in the Kremlin

¶7. (C) In another example of infighting, reports surfaced that Boris Kovalchuk, the 28-year-old son of Putin insider Yuriy Kovalchuk, would be

¶8. (C) In sum, observers agree that Medvedev faces a tough road ahead, despite being given an early chance to succeed. Potanin told the Ambassador

¶9. (C) Although many thought he was advanced only into a "fall-back" position, Sergey Ivanov also gained from the November reshuffle, which made

OTHER CONTENDERS -----

¶10. (C) Given broad agreement that Medvedev and Sergey Ivanov could well falter, observers are also watching other potential contenders. Of late

¶11. (C) We also have noted more talk recently about Sergey Sobyanin, the former Tyumen governor who was appointed to head the Presidential Administration

¶12. (C) Sobyanin's impact on the byzantine politics and power balance inside the PA, and any resulting impact on the succession, remain unclear

¶13. (C) Russian Railroads CEO Vladimir Yakunin, a close friend of Putin, has kept an extremely low profile but continues to be seen by many as

¶14. (C) The candidates mentioned above do not necessarily exhaust the range of possibilities. Kryshitanovskaya continues to predict that still other

NEUTRALIZING THE OUTSIDE OPPOSITION -----

¶15. (SBU) Even as the maneuvering among political insiders picks up steam, the Kremlin has made significant progress in recent months in neutralizing the outside opposition

¶16. (C) At the same time, the Kremlin has been working on various fronts to counter the efforts of former PM Mikhail Kasyanov to mount a presidential

COMMENT -----

¶17. (C) The succession process is now fully underway, albeit in an early stage. The current focus remains on the two figures seen to have gained